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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 On September 12, 1994, two masked men entered a branch of 
the Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  One of them pointed 
a gun at a teller, while the other jumped over the counter and 
removed money from the bank drawers.  Their deed done, the two 
men fled the bank, hopped in a waiting car and sped from the 
scene of the crime.  Thomas Price was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania of 
armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(d) and 2, 
and knowingly and willfully carrying and using a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 924(c)(1) and 2.  Mr. Price now appeals his conviction on 
various grounds. 
 
I. 
 
 Mr. Price first challenges the district court's instruction 
to the jury regarding the "use and carry" count. 
 Section 924 of Title 18 of the United States Code states, 
inter alia, that "[w]hoever, during and in relation to any crime 
of violence . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court of 
the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition 
to the punishment provided for such crime of violence . . . be 
sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . ."  18 U.S.C. 
§924(c)(1).   
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 Mr. Price was charged with violating this provision in the 
district court.  At the end of the trial, the district court gave 
the jury the following instruction:  
 The indictment also charges that on or about 
September 12, 1994, in the western district of 
Pennsylvania, defendant Thomas Price used a firearm, a 
.45 caliber Norinco pistol, during a crime of violence, 
armed bank robbery. 
 
 In order to sustain its burden of proof for the 
crime of using a firearm during a crime of violence, 
the government must prove the following two essential 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
 One, Defendant Thomas Price committed the crime of 
armed robbery as charged in the indictment; and 
 
 Two, during and in relation to the commission of 
that crime, the defendant knowingly used a firearm. 
 
 The government has charged Thomas Price with 
aiding and abetting this crime as well.  All of the 
instructions that I previously gave you about aiding 
and abetting also apply to this charge. 
 
. . . 
 
 The phrase uses or carries a firearm means having 
a firearm available to assist in the commission of the 
alleged armed bank robbery. 
 
 In determining whether defendant Thomas Price used 
or carried a firearm, you may consider all the factors 
received in evidence in the case, including the nature 
of the underlying crime of violence, the proximity of 
defendant to the firearm in question, the usefulness of 
the firearm to the crime alleged and the circumstances 
surrounding the presence of the firearm. 
 
 The government is not required to show that the 
defendant actually displayed or fired the weapon.  The 
government is required, however, to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the firearm was under defendant's 
control at the time the crime of violence was 
committed. 
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 As I stated before, you must also consider whether 
the defendant aided or abetted the use or carrying of a 
firearm in arriving at your verdict. 
 
 If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas 
Price aided and abetted Charles Stubbs in the use of a 
firearm during the commission of the armed bank 
robbery, then you may find Mr. Price guilty of using a 
firearm during the commission of a felony, even though 
there is no proof that he actually had the firearm in 
his physical possession. 
 
 You may find that Mr. Price aided and abetted Mr. 
Stubbs in the use of a firearm during the commission of 
a felony only if you find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Price knowingly joined in, aided or assisted 
in the bank robbery, that his action was willful and 
voluntarily taken and that he had knowledge that a 
firearm was to be used in the bank robbery. 
Appendix at 451A-453A. 
 The two issues regarding this instruction are, first, 
whether having a firearm available to assist is sufficient to 
meet the second element of "using a firearm," and, second, 
whether one can be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on an 
"aiding and abetting" theory. 
A. 
 Mr. Price argues that the district court erred when it 
instructed the jury that "[t]he phrase uses or carries a firearm 
means having a firearm available to assist in the commission of 
the alleged armed robbery" because that sentence "is an incorrect 
statement of the law in this Circuit."  Appellant's Brief at 34. 
Specifically, he argues that under our holding in United States 
v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1989), 
"availability alone [is] insufficient to establish a use in 
relation to a crime of violence."  Appellant's Brief at 34.  The 
government, in response, argues that "appellant Price's position 
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is based upon a misreading of Theodoropoulos."  Government's 
Brief at 17. 
 In Theodoropoulos, this Court held that  
possession of a firearm constitutes use under section 
924(c) if there is: 
i) Proof of a transaction in which the 
circumstances surrounding the presence of a 
firearm suggest that the possessor of the 
firearm intended to have it available for 
possible use during the transaction. . . . 
866 F.2d at 597 (quoting Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d at 254) 
(emphasis added); see also Hill, 967 F.2d at 905 (holding that 
"[p]ossession of a firearm constitutes use under 18 U.S.C. 
§924(c) where there is evidence 'that the defendant intended to 
have the firearm available for use or possible use during a crime 
of violence . . . and that the firearm was placed in a spot where 
it was readily accessible at that time.'"); United States v. 
Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 312 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).  This language 
closely parallels that used by the district court in the instant 
case.  Accordingly, if Theodoropoulos did govern our construction 
of section 924(c)(1), we would hold that the district court 
properly instructed the jury. 
 Theodoropoulos, however, no longer governs.  The United 
States Supreme Court recently issued an opinion in which it 
clarified the meaning of the term "use" in section 924(c)(1). 
Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 501, 505 (1995).  In Bailey, 
the Court rejected the holding of Theodoropoulos and held that 
the "proximity and accessibility standard provides almost no 
limitation on the kind of possession that would be criminalized . 
. . ."  Id. at 506.  Rather, the Court held, "[Section] 924(c)(1) 
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requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the 
firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an 
operative factor in relation to the predicate offense."  Id. at 
505.  The Court further explained that "[t]he active-employment 
understanding of 'use' certainly includes brandishing, bartering, 
striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, 
a firearm."  Id. at 508.  However, "[i]f the gun is not disclosed 
or mentioned by the offender, it is not actively employed and it 
is not 'used.'"  Id. 
 Bailey's interpretation of the "use and carry" provision 
demands a different inquiry from that required under 
Theodoropoulos.  It is no longer enough that the weapon be 
available to the defendant; rather, it must have played an active 
role in the perpetration of the predicate offense beyond 
emboldening the perpetrator.  Therefore, we hold that the 
district court's instruction to the jury, while accurately 
reflecting the law of the Third Circuit at the time, was 
erroneous in light of Bailey.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
our holding in Theodoropoulos conflicts with the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of "use" in Bailey, Theodoropoulos is overruled. 
B. 
 Mr. Price was also charged with the section 924 count under 
an aiding and abetting theory, an instruction which he also 
disputes.  He contends that "aiding and abetting liability is 
inapplicable to a charge of carrying and using a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence."  Appellant's Brief at 
34. 
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 We reject this argument.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), "[w]hoever 
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal."  This section has been routinely 
applied in conjunction with section 924(c) to convict individuals 
of "aiding and abetting in using or carrying a firearm" in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  See, e.g., United States v. 
Wacher, No. 93-3372, 1995 WL 757876 (10th Cir. Dec. 26, 1995); 
United States v. Pipola, No. 95-1264, 1995 WL 760560 (2d Cir. 
Dec. 22, 1995); United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 825 (5th 
Cir. 1995); Dillon v. United States, 69 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Rivera, 68 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Easter, 66 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied sub nom. Jemerigbe v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 547 
(1995), and cert. denied sub nom. Ronnie O. Lea v. United States, 
1995 WL 698897 (U.S. 1996) ; United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 
647, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 
213 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 
1105 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2724 (1994); 
United States v. Travis, 993 F.2d 1316, 1321 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 229 (1993), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 245 
(1993); United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 
1991); see also United States v. Mathis, No. 93-454-01, 1994 WL 
413142 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1994). 
 It appears that no case in the Third Circuit has considered 
a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on an "aiding 
and abetting" theory.  We see no reason, however, why we should 
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rule differently from every other circuit in the country, and our 
own district courts, and Mr. Price offers none, beyond a 
conclusory argument that the theory is "inapplicable." Therefore, 
we reject Mr. Price's argument and hold that the district court 
correctly instructed the jury on the "aiding and abetting" 
theory. 
C. 
 We must now determine whether the district court's error in 
instructing the jury was harmless or requires reversal of Mr. 
Price's conviction on the section 924(c)(1) count.  The error was 
one of statutory interpretation, not constitutional in nature. 
"We have held that non-constitutional error is harmless when 'it 
is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment.'"  United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d 
Cir.) (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 
278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1699 (1995). 
Because we conclude that the error was harmless, we will affirm. 
 The section 924 charge against Thomas Price was based on two 
alternative theories: first, that Mr. Price himself "used" the 
weapon under the Theodoropoulos standard and, second, that Mr. 
Price aided and abetted the "use" or "carrying" of the weapon by 
his accomplice, Charles Stubbs.  Under either theory, it is 
highly probable -- indeed, inevitable -- that the jury found that 
Mr. Price was one of the masked men who robbed the bank and, more 
specifically, that he was the man who jumped over the counter and 
collected the money while Mr. Stubbs was brandishing the gun. 
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 That Mr. Stubbs both "used" and "carried" the firearm within 
the statutory meaning is perfectly clear, and therefore, the only 
remaining question is whether Mr. Price aided and abetted that 
use and carrying.  Because the jury had to conclude that Mr. 
Price was the man who entered the bank with Mr. Stubbs, we think 
the evidence supporting this conclusion is overwhelming, 
whichever theory the jury utilized to convict.  First, Mr. Stubbs 
testified that Mr. Price knew beforehand that a gun would be 
used, and the nature of the offense seems to strongly support 
that testimony.  Second, the use of the gun did not occur in one 
instant; rather, according to the evidence, Mr. Stubbs pointed 
the gun while Mr. Price gathered the money.  Even if Mr. Price 
had not known in advance that Mr. Stubbs was going to use a gun 
during the robbery, it seems perfectly clear that Mr. Price was 
aware that the gun was being used while he continued to 
participate in the robbery.   
 In other words, Mr. Stubbs was plainly using and carrying a 
firearm in connection with a crime of violence; Mr. Price 
probably knew in advance, and most certainly knew at the time, 
what Mr. Stubbs was doing; yet Mr. Price continued to participate 
in the offense.  In light of these facts, we find that it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment 
of the jury, and therefore we will affirm. 
 
II. 
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 Mr. Price raises several other claims in this appeal. First, 
he contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law 
to sustain his conviction.  Specifically, Mr. Price argues that 
the evidence fails to demonstrate that Mr. Price had any prior 
knowledge that his accomplice would be utilizing a firearm in the 
robbery.  Appellant's Brief at 21, 24.  However, Mr. Price's 
accomplice, Charles Stubbs, did offer testimony to this effect.  
Appendix at 260A.  This testimony was sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of prior knowledge on Mr. Price's part, and 
therefore sufficient evidence to find him guilty of armed bank 
robbery and carrying or using a firearm during the armed robbery. 
 Second, Mr. Price argues that the court improperly charged 
the jury concerning the existence of Mr. Stubbs's plea agreement. 
Appellant's Brief at 36-37.  The court charged the jury that 
"[t]he Stubbs plea agreement was not marked as an exhibit and was 
not admitted into evidence during the course of the trial." 
Appendix at 487A.  This instruction was correct, and certainly 
was not an "abuse of discretion."  United States v. Price, 13 
F.3d 711, 724 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Reaves v. United 
States,  114 S. Ct. 1863 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. Long 
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2754 (1994), and cert. denied sub 
nom. Jackson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2754 (1994), and cert. 
denied sub nom. Reaves v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 155 (1994).  
 Finally, Mr. Price claims that the prosecutor engaged in 
"forensic misconduct" by improperly vouching for certain 
witnesses, disparaging Mr. Price's counsel, casting aspersions at 
the defendant and arguing facts not of record.  Because Mr. 
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Price's counsel did not object to these statements at trial, we 
review these statements for "plain error," that is, "egregious 
error or a manifest miscarriage of justice."  United States v. 
Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 
(1988).  The statements singled out by Mr. Price fall far short 
of violating this exacting standard. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the reasons outlined above, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
 
